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Just How Independent is the Fed?
Brenton Swenson, Masters of Public Policy
Faculty Mentor: Sven Wilson

Introduction

Methods

• The Federal Reserve has a duel mandate to fight
inflation while keeping unemployment low.

• I ran time-series regressions with the Fed Funds
Rate as the dependent variable. The main
independent variables were unemployment and
interaction variables between inflation and a
dummy variable for political year type (election
year, year prior, etc.)

• The Fed is designed to be largely independent
from political influence. Just how independent the
Fed actually is remains an open question
• According to Political Business Cycle Theory,
presidents who want to maximize their chances for
re-election will attempt to fight inflation early in
their term, while allowing inflation to rise before
the election with the goal of boosting the economy.1

• To control for serial correlation and
heteroskedasticity,, I used robust standard errors.
•To control for reverse causality, I included the FFR
lagged one month.

Data

Regression Results
Intercept

• Monthly data on the Fed Funds Rate, the
unemployment rate, and the CPI from 1955 to 2005
was obtained using the dataset used by Todd E.
Clark and Richard W. McCracken in their article
“Averaging Forecasts from VARs with Uncertain
Instabilities,” published in Journal of Applied
Econometrics, Vol 25, No. 1, 2010.2

FFR_1

Pooled
-.2396228
(.097641)**
.9670669
(.018848)***
.0010252
(.0009242)
-1.48e-06
(1.43e-06)
.0466129
(.0184427)**
.1800951
(.1463736)
.2926928
(.143453)*
-.046276
(.119517)
-.1241805
(.3512521)
.1473

Time
Time^2
Unemployment
Monthly inflation* (Elec
yr-3)
Monthly inflation* (Elec
yr-2)
Monthly inflation* (Elec
yr-1)
Monthly inflation* (Elec
yr)
Joint Equivalence Test on
inflation*year variables

• I constructed variables for inflation from the
change in CPI and dummy variables for every 4th
year (election year, year prior, etc)

Discussion

Party Retains
-.3137833
(.103159)***
.9958613
(.024345)***
.0001583
(.0009539)
-3.24e-07
(1.47e-06)
.0472553
(.0229951)**
.3171101
(.2482635)
.6349398
(.2486764)**
-.0352071
(.151895)
.043117
(.1559806)
.0134

New Party

• When the same party retains the presidency,
whether through re-election or in an open-race,
there is evidence that inflation is managed as
Political Business Cycle Theory would predict.

.1493637
(.1371925)
.901941
(.0299015)***
.0037412
(.0013834)***
-5.74e-06
(2.18e-06)***
-.0244796
(.0258248)
.116479
(.1388569)
.3822997
(.1910811)*
.229277
(.1533335)
.1895242
(.4441947)

• There is no evidence inflation is managed in this
manner when the same party does not retain the
presidency.
• Dramatic differences in how the Fed changes the
FFR in response to inflation across different
political years gives evidence that the Fed may be
susceptible to presidential pressure. Why some
presidents appear more able to influence the Fed
than others remains a question for further study.

R^2
.9737
.9821
.5017
*-Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1%

• This pattern will be visible for presidents who
were re-elected, or when the same party retained the
presidency, but not when the party lost the
presidency.
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• The Fed will raise the Fed Funds Rate in response
to inflation more in the first 2 years of a presidential
term than in the latter 2 years.

Change in FFR for a 1 percentage
point increase in monthly inflation
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